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Abstract : At face value, Turkey–Rice is not the most complex or important
WTO dispute ever litigated. The facts of the case give strong reason to believe
that Turkey’s restrictions on rice imports from the United States were not
GATT-consistent. Turkey’s steadfast refusal to provide exonerating evidence in
its defence and the Panel’s drawing of appropriate inference were probably the
most remarkable issues of the case. Nevertheless, Turkey–Rice raises at least one
interesting legal and economic question: How ‘activist ’ are dispute panels today,
and how interventionist should they be during the litigation process? We discuss
the justiﬁcation and role of activist panels and assess the consequences for
parties’ strategic behavior and incentive to provide accurate information.
1. Introduction
On 21 September 2007 the Panel issued its ﬁnal report in Turkey – Measures
Aﬀecting the Importation of Rice.1 The action, brought by the United States,
with Argentina, Australia, China, Egypt, the EU, Korea, Pakistan, and Thailand as
Third Parties, challenged various aspects of Turkey’s import restrictions on rice.
Turkey is a producer and net importer of rice. Since 2004 Turkey has oﬃcially
structured its import regime of rice in the following manner: (a) for some periods
between 2004 and 2006, Turkey had in place predetermined tariﬀ-rate quotas
(TRQ) with those ‘ in-quota’ imports being oﬀered at preferential tariﬀ rates ;
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(b) for free-trade-agreement partners EC and Macedonia, a minor ﬁxed zero-tariﬀ
TRQ was in place; and (c) ‘over-quota’ imports were being submitted to MFN
tariﬀ rates of 34, 36, and 45% ad valorem (depending on the type of rice).2
(Turkey’s WTO bound rate for rice is 45% ad valorem.)
Three circumstances of Turkey’s import regime are of signiﬁcance for this
dispute: First, all rice imports required an approved Certiﬁcate of Control
(‘Certiﬁcate ’) from Turkey’s Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Aﬀairs (MARA).
Second, Turkey seems to have adopted a policy of denying Certiﬁcates of Control
to over-quota rice imports at MFN rates (at least to those originating in the United
States). This policy resulted in the practice of eﬀectively channeling all rice imports
through in-quota TRQ imports. Third, the TRQ exhibited the unique feature of a
domestic purchase requirement: importers could import foreign rice only if they
also bought a signiﬁcant share of domestic rice, either directly from Turkish pro-
ducers or from the Turkish Rice Board (TMO), a governmental intervention
agency.
From a domestic political point of view, Turkey’s import policy for rice made
absolute sense. Given the twin goals of achieving the complete absorption of
domestic rice production and of maintaining high producer prices, the choice of
channeling imports through the TRQ was an eﬀective policy, especially for a de-
veloping country that lacks suﬃcient funds for creative subsidization policies.
Turkey needs between 250,000 and 300,000 tons of rice imports each year to
satisfy domestic demand. TRQs, provided with a domestic purchasing condition,
were a good mechanism to ﬂexibly regulate importation while keeping up do-
mestic demand (and therefore prices). This measure seems superior to using a
tether between bound and applied rates, costly production subsidies, or charging
an intervention agency to tamper with domestic prices by means of building up
and liquidating stocks.
However, from an international legal standpoint, Turkey’s red-tape measure
was contentious. The United States challenged Turkey’s denial, or failure to grant,
out-of-quota import licenses, as well as the domestic purchase requirement for in-
quota imports of rice, as inconsistent with Articles III :4 and XI:1 of GATT 1994;
Article 4.2 of the Agreement on Agriculture (AoA); Article 2.1 and paragraph 1(a)
of the TRIMs Agreement; and Articles 3.5(e) and 3.5(f) of the Import Licensing
Agreement.3
The Panel concluded that Turkey’s practice of denying approval of Certiﬁcates
for various periods of time for importation of rice outside of the tariﬀ quota
amounts constituted a quantitative import restriction and a practice of dis-
cretionary import licensing, neither of which are permitted under the Agreement
on Agriculture (AoA), Article 4.2 and footnote 1.4 With respect to the in-quota
2 Ibid., para. 2.17.
3 Ibid., paras. 3.1–3.2.
4 Ibid., para. 7.138.
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TRQ regime, the Panel found inconsistency with GATT Article III :4: ‘[T]hrough
the requirement that importers must purchase domestic rice in order to be allowed
to import rice at reduced-tariﬀ levels under the tariﬀ quotas, Turkey accorded less
favourable treatment to imported rice than that accorded to like domestic rice.’5
The Panel addressed only the GATT Article III :4 and AoA Article 4.2 challenges ;
it declined to consider the rest on grounds of judicial economy.
If Turkey–Rice has any lasting signiﬁcance, it is likely in the lesson it oﬀers for
responding Members that refuse to cooperate with the Panel: failure to respond to
a Panel’s request for information may greatly reduce the burden on the com-
plaining Member to demonstrate a prima facie case before the burden of proof
shifts to the responding Member, because the Panel may be prepared to assume or
infer certain key facts rather than requiring the Complainant to prove them.6
The actual drawing of such inferences, as distinct from the threat, has been
relatively rare in Panel and Appellate Body proceedings, but in this case the
Turkish recalcitrance to answer the Panel’s repeated requests for information was
particularly blatant. Once the United States had established its prima facie case and
the burden had shifted to Turkey, Turkey was placed in an impossible situation: it
could either refuse to provide the incriminating data and allow the inferences to be
drawn (as it did), or produce the documents that likely would have established the
veracity of the allegations by the United States.
In Section 2 we discuss the facts and the contentions of the key parties, the
United States and Turkey. Section 3 addresses the rationale and conclusions of the
Panel. Section 4 analyzes the legal and economic signiﬁcance of the report. Section
5 brieﬂy summarizes our main ﬁndings and their likely impact for future WTO
litigation.
2. Summary of facts and contentions of the parties
The Turkish rice market is complex, as the Panel’s characterization of the facts
of the case show. At various times, the United States, Egypt, the EC (Italy and
Bulgaria in particular), China, Australia, Ukraine, Viet Nam, and Thailand ex-
ported rice to Turkey. Distance is a factor in rice shipments. Because of the longer
shipping distance, US exporters tend to make fewer shipments of larger allotments,
typically between 10,000 and 20,000 metric tons each. What likely concerned the
United States most was that, for a 20-month period in 2004 and 2005, no over-
quota shipments of US rice to Turkey had occurred.7
2.1 The facts
The essential facts are confusing and incomplete. What follows is an attempt to
summarize the main facts and events.
5 Ibid., para. 7.241.
6 Ibid., para. 7.106.
7 Ibid., paras. 2.24–2.26.
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2.1.1 Overview
Turkey is a producer and net importer of rice.8 Its annual consumption varies
between 540,000 and 570,000 tons. Rice comes in three aggregation forms:
‘paddy’ and ‘brown’ rice are preliminary stages; both can be converted into (and
are consumed as) ‘milled white rice ’. Three import regimes existed at the time of
the complaint. There is a small ﬁxed zero-rate quota for preferential trade agree-
ment partners,9 a second category of TRQ-cum-domestic purchase requirements,10
and a third category of over-quota imports subject to Turkey’s MFN duties at a
bound rate of 45%. Under Turkish law and administrative practice, an approved
Certiﬁcate of Control is a necessary but not a suﬃcient condition for importation
of rice. Certiﬁcates are issued by the Ministry of Agricultural and Rural Aﬀairs
(MARA). The Certiﬁcate is submitted to Turkish customs authorities at the port of
entry. Oﬃcially, Certiﬁcates may be refused for a variety of reasons, primarily
related to noncompliance of imports with the speciﬁcations in the Certiﬁcate or
inconsistency with SPS requirements.11
2.1.2 Over-quota import regime
Evidence presented by the United States indicated that Certiﬁcates for over-quota
imports had been denied during certain periods after September 2003 and that
the time periods for accepting Certiﬁcates had also been restricted from time to
time.12 Importers of US rice had their Certiﬁcate applications denied repeatedly,
ostensibly on grounds of spelling errors and other formal bagatelles. The Panel
concluded that MARA’s General Directorate of Protection and Control had ‘re-
peatedly and periodically’ issued recommendations to the Minister of Agriculture
to temporarily suspend Certiﬁcates for importation of rice outside of the tariﬀ
quota limits (so-called ‘ letters of acceptance’).13 At one point the Ministry of State
of Turkey advised the US Trade Representative that he would see to it that
Certiﬁcates for imports from the United States would be issued again in April
2006, suggesting that prior to the issuance of that letter such Certiﬁcates were
being denied for domestic political reasons.
In some instances, importers of US rice appealed the rejections of their
Certiﬁcate applications before Turkey’s administrative court. The administrative
court rejected the importers’ appeals, inter alia, by giving eﬀect to the ‘letters of
acceptance’ by MARA’s General Directorate of Protection and Control, in which
8 Turkey’s rice production rose from around 40% to 60% of domestic rice consumption over the
period between 2002 and 2006. Turkish rice production was equivalent to 290,000 and 390,000 tons of
milled white rice in the period at issue (ibid., paras. 2.9–2.10).
9 The zero-duty PTA quota granted to the EC andMacedonia was ﬁxed at 36,000 tons per year (ibid.,
paras. 2.32–2.33).
10 The maximum amount assigned under the TQR was 300,000 tons of ready-to-consume milled
white rice (ibid., para. 2.78).
11 Ibid., para. 2.48.
12 Ibid., para. 7.80.
13 Ibid., para. 7.80 (on the nature of ‘ letters of acceptance’, cf. ibid., paras. 7.210–7.221).
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the General Director advises/recommends to the Minister of Agriculture that he
temporarily suspend the granting of over-quota Certiﬁcates (claiming that supply
is secured with domestic and in-quota rice imports).
Among the administrative court’s reasons for restrictions on imports were the
protection of domestic rice producers14 and Turkish government agency determi-
nations that existing rice stocks in Turkey were adequate for the nation’s needs. All
challenges by importers contesting MARA’s denial of Certiﬁcates in Turkish
courts were resolved in favor of MARA. One administrative court dismissed a
challenge to a Certiﬁcate rejection on the ground that it was legal for MARA to
reject applications based on adequate supply, and to continue refusal to approve
certiﬁcates until domestic consumption volumes and trade policies were re-
viewed.15
The (undisputed) evidence at hand supporting the US contentions is : (a) a
handful of rejection letters (whether as evidence of a deliberate government prac-
tice or simply of isolated events) ; (b) letters of acceptance, providing evidence of
recommendations to the Turkish Minister of Agriculture by a high MARA oﬃcial
to temporarily suspend the granting of over-quota Certiﬁcates as a matter of gen-
eral policy at various times; and (c) a continuing stream of rice imports into
Turkey – whether through in-quota or over-quota imports is unclear. This evi-
dence raises the question whether the rejection letters submitted by the United
States are evidence of a systematic trade restriction, at least of US imports (as
claimed by the United States), or simply isolated instances of Certiﬁcate denial
based on formal shortcomings in the Certiﬁcate application process, as claimed by
Turkey.
Turkey alleged that some 2,242 Certiﬁcates had been authorized by MARA
between 2003 and November 2006, claiming that 95% of total Certiﬁcate appli-
cations were oﬃcially approved between 2003 and November 2006,16 and that
59.5% of the Certiﬁcates were allotted to over-quota imports (i.e., MFN or FTA
trade). Turkey also stated that ‘ letters of acceptance’ had no legal bearing on
decisions concerning granting of Certiﬁcates, and that the Minister of Agriculture
had no legal authority to restrict rice imports. Moreover, according to the Turkish
defense, the administrative court wrongly gave legal eﬀect to the letters of
acceptance addressed to the Minister of Agriculture.
The crux of the matter, however, is that Turkey, despite repeated requests by the
Panel, did not provide crucial exonerative information. Turkey based its refusal to
provide information on an obscure domestic criminal law relating to disclosure of
‘conﬁdential ’ information. Despite multiple requests by the Panel, Turkey refused
to provide to the Panel blacked-out copies of the 2,242 granted Certiﬁcates, or
14 According to the administrative court, rejections of Certiﬁcates were motivated by the ‘observance
of the common good and public service keeping in mind the goals of protecting [Turkish] national pro-
ducer[s], to redress their grievances and to prevent unnecessary stock build up’ (ibid., para. 2.68).
15 Ibid., para. 2.70.
16 Ibid., para. 7.95.
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the 56 blacked-out copies of denied and resubmitted Certiﬁcate applications,
identiﬁed by the United States as being the most crucial evidence.17 Turkey also
refused to provide information on those instances where letters of acceptance, i.e.
recommendations by MARA’s Director General, were not implemented or were
explicitly rejected by Turkish import authorities.18 Turkey did submit summaries
of the Certiﬁcates and a list of the rejected applications, along with reasons for
denial.19
Turkey oﬀered to submit the 56 rejected, resubmitted, and eventually approved
Certiﬁcate applications on the condition that they would be made available only to
the Panel and to the Secretariat, but not to the United States or the Third Parties.
The Panel rejected this oﬀer because of the prohibition in DSU Article 18.1 barring
ex parte communications between the Parties and the Panel, noting that Turkey
had not made any request for special treatment of conﬁdential information in the
course of the Panel proceedings.20
Thus, the Panel was ultimately forced to base its decision on the scant evidence
laid out by the United States, namely a limited number of letters of refusal, letters
of acceptance, the defense by MARA’s attorney, and the rulings of the domestic
administrative court.
2.1.3 In-quota tariﬀ regime
The United States also alleged that importers of rice under Turkey’s below-
MFN-tariﬀ TRQ were required to purchase speciﬁed quantities of locally grown
rice from the Turkish Grain Board (TMO), Turkish producers, or producer as-
sociations. Turkey conﬁrmed the existence of a domestic purchase requirement for
importations.21 The Turkish policy mandated that rice importers purchase up to
four-ﬁfths of the imported amount from local sources, with the conditions for
sourcing from TMO being most favorable. Where the litigating parties disagree is
the eﬀect for importers of this tying of import rights to domestic rice purchases.
Turkey emphasizes the advantages provided by the lower-than-MFN import tar-
iﬀs, while the United States sees the local content obligation as discrimination in
favor of domestic like products and against imports.
2.2 Principal contentions of the parties
The United States challenged Turkey’s denial of or failure to grant licences to
import rice at or below the bound rate of duty; the requirement that importers
must purchase speciﬁed quantities of domestic rice in order to be allowed to
17 Ibid., paras. 2.51–2.57. Turkey oﬀered to provide the Certiﬁcates in conﬁdence to the Panel,
without making them available to the United States, but the Panel rejected the oﬀer as an unacceptable
ex parte submission.
18 These instances of rejection would have lent credence to Turkish allegations that recommendations
by MARA, such as the letters of acceptance, have no legal eﬀect on import authorities.
19 Ibid., para. 2.63.
20 Ibid., para. 7.102.
21 Ibid., paras. 7.149, 7.151.
150 DAV ID A. GANTZ AND S IMON A. B. SCHROPP
at https:/www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/S1474745608004205
Downloaded from https:/www.cambridge.org/core. University of Basel Library, on 11 Jul 2017 at 16:39:46, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, available
import speciﬁed quantities of rice at reduced tariﬀ levels ; Turkey’s administration
of tariﬀ-rate quotas for reduced-tariﬀ duty imports of rice ; and administration of
its import regime for rice more generally. The United States also characterized
Turkey’s actions as a ‘blanket prohibition on the issuance of Control Certiﬁ-
cates ’.22
Turkey contended that, throughout the period, over-quota imports had been
permitted and Certiﬁcates issued, and that in any event Certiﬁcates were not
the equivalent of import licenses. Without admitting any violation of WTO
Agreements, Turkey asserted that, since reduced-tariﬀ duty imports of rice were no
longer permitted, the Panel should refrain from ruling on their legality.23 Turkey
also alleged that the reduced-tariﬀ duty imports were administered through
‘automatic import licensing procedures’ in a nondiscriminatory, predictable, and
transparent manner. Consequently, it denied that any of its measures were incon-
sistent with provisions of the WTO Agreements as contended by the United
States.24
The United States asserted that the requirement that importers of rice must
also purchase speciﬁed quantities of domestic rice was inconsistent with GATT
Article III :4:
Turkey’s imposition of a domestic purchase requirement under the TRQ regime
on potential importers of rice into Turkey is inconsistent with Article III :4 of the
GATT 1994, because the measure treats imported rice less favorably than do-
mestic rice and adversely aﬀects the conditions of competition for imported rice
in the Turkish market.25
Turkey did not deny the existence of this requirement, but asserted that it was
actually a measure that beneﬁted imported products by making it cheaper to pur-
chase imported rather than domestic rice, and one that did not aﬀect conditions of
competition between imported and domestic rice. Therefore, there was no viola-
tion of GATT Article III :4.26
3. Rationale and conclusions of the Panel
The Panel characterized the ‘measure’ before it as ‘Turkey’s alleged denial, or
failure to grant, from September 2003 and for periods of time, licences to import
rice outside of the tariﬀ rate quota’.27 Because a series of substantive GATT and
22 Ibid., para. 7.22.
23 Turkey asserted that it had withdrawn the below-MFN TRQ as of 31 July 2006 and had no
intention to reinstate tariﬀ quotas for the importation of rice (ibid., paras. 5.29 and 7.171).
24 Ibid., para. 3.3.
25 Ibid., para. 7.197, quoting United States’ ﬁrst submission, para. 86.
26 Ibid., paras. 7.204–7.210.
27 Ibid., paras. 7.22–7.31.
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covered agreement violations were raised by the United States, the Panel, once it
had disposed of the procedural issues (including burden of proof and inferences
from Turkey’s failure to comply with the Panel’s requests for information), was
required to determine the proper order of analysis of the substantive claims. It
chose to begin with the Agreement on Agriculture Article 4.2 and GATT Article
XI:1, reasoning that if a violation of either by Turkey were found, ‘the question of
how the measure had been administered by Turkey becomes irrelevant’. The Panel
would then avoid having to address either the Import Licensing Agreement or
GATT Article X issues.28 The Article III :4 question, relating to the requirement
that importers must also purchase locally grown rice, was addressed separately.
The Panel decided that it would examine the AoA before considering GATT
Article XI:1. The AoA ‘may be considered more speciﬁc to the border measures
imposed on agricultural products ’ even though the two provisions both apply to
border measures.29
3.1 Burden of proof
Turkey’s failure to provide information requested by the Panel is intertwined in the
Panel’s view with issues relating to the burden of proof in proceedings before
WTO Panels and its duties more generally under the DSU:
Under Article 11 of the DSU, Panels have the duty to ‘make an objective assess-
ment of the matter before [them], including an objective assessment of the facts of
the case’. In order to exercise such duty, Panels have been granted the authority
‘to seek information and technical advice from any individual or body which
[they deem] appropriate’ by Article 13.1 of the DSU. Pursuant to Article 13.1 of
the DSU, Members have committed to collaborate with Panels in the exercise
of their duties: ‘ [a] Member should respond promptly and fully to any request
by a Panel for such information as the Panel considers necessary and appropri-
ate’.30
The Panel noted that the initial burden of proof rested on the United States as a
Complainant, who asserts the aﬃrmative elements of a particular claim, to make a
prima facie case. If the United States established such a case, the burden would
shift to Turkey. However, this duty on the part of the Complainant is aﬀected by
the willingness of Turkey to comply with requests for information. Where there is
no such cooperation, and the Panel remains seized with a duty to make an objec-
tive assessment of the facts under DSU Article 11, ‘a Panel is entitled to draw
appropriate inferences ’. As the Appellate Body stated in United States–Wheat
Gluten, ‘Where a party refuses to provide information requested by a Panel under
Article 13.1 of the DSU, that refusal will be one of the relevant facts of record, and
28 Ibid., paras. 7.41–7.42.
29 Ibid., para. 7.48.
30 Ibid., para. 7.1.
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indeed an important fact, to be taken into account in determining the appropriate
inference to be drawn.’31
Such inferences are not conclusive. Rather, ‘ they have to be considered by the
Panel, with all other available evidence on the record, to determine whether the
Complainant has succeeded in meeting its burden to make its prima facie case and
whether the Respondent has successfully rebutted such a case ’.32
The United States encouraged the Panel to change its ﬁnal report to clarify that
the burden of proof in making a prima facie case rests solely on the Complainant,
not partially on the Respondent ; the Panel could properly consider only the
evidence submitted by the United States. The United States explained that the
proposed language would:
[A]void any possible misinterpretation of the current text as partially relieving
the Complainant of its burden of making out a prima facie case by placing some
of that burden on the respondent. The burden of making out a prima facie case by
making argumentation and providing evidence on the record lies solely with the
complaining party – in this case, the United States. Once the complainant has
made out a prima facie case, a burden which the United States has met, it falls to
the responding party to rebut that prima facie case with evidence and arguments
of its own.33
The Panel was not fully persuaded. It concluded that the requirement that a Panel
make an ‘objective assessment’ under DSU Article 11 requires it to consider all
evidence on the record, whether submitted by the parties or obtained under its
broad information-seeking authority. This approach, the Panel reasoned, ‘would
not relieve the complaining party of its burden to make a prima facie case_ ’.
34
3.2 Factual analysis
The Panel decided to proceed strictly sequentially on facts and legal analysis as
well. It ﬁrst engaged in a factual analysis aimed at determining whether Turkey’s
conduct really constituted the denial, or failure to grant, licenses to import outside
the tariﬀ quota,35 perhaps driven in part by the need to deﬁne the ‘measure at
issue’. Only afterwards did the Panel engage in a legal analysis, examining whether
the measure proven to have occurred can be considered to be a border measure ‘of
the kind which have been required to be converted into ordinary customs duties ’.
The Panel reviewed evidence indicating that MARA had deliberately suspended
issuance of Certiﬁcates for importation of rice above the tariﬀ quota limits for
various periods from September 2003 to April 2006. It rejected assertions by
31 Ibid., para. 7.10, quoting Appellate Body Report,United States – Deﬁnitive SafeguardMeasures on
Imports of Wheat Gluten from the European Communities, WT/DS166/AB/R, adopted 19 January 2001,
DSR 2001:II, 717, para. 174; emphasis added.
32 Panel Report, Turkey–Rice, para. 7.11.
33 Ibid., paras. 5.9–5.11.
34 Ibid., para. 5.12; see para. 7.60 of the Final Report.
35 Ibid., paras. 7.58–7.107.
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Turkey that the actions of MARA were ultra vires, choosing to assume that the
actions of a WTOMember were consistent with its own legislation. The Panel also
considered that the correspondence between the Turkish Foreign Secretary and the
US Trade Representative, in which Turkey promised to grant Certiﬁcates to import
rice as of 1 April 2006, was evidence that such Certiﬁcates were not being granted
prior to that date. On the basis of this factual evidence, the Panel concluded that
the United States had established a prima facie case on the part of the United States,
shifting the burden to Turkey to rebut the presumption that Turkey had denied or
failed to grant certiﬁcates for rice imports outside of the tariﬀ rate quota.36
It was here that Turkey’s refusal to provide full information on the Certiﬁcates
became a major factor. Turkey had asserted that the Certiﬁcates were ‘systemati-
cally and regularly’ approved, but showed no willingness to back up the assertion
with corroborating evidence.37 In particular, Turkey refused to provide copies of
the applications considered most relevant by the United States, as noted above.
The Panel seems to have been annoyed that the evidence requested by the Panel
regarding the Certiﬁcates of Control was clearly in Turkey’s sole possession, and
that concerns regarding risks of ‘ information leaks’ and criminal prosecutions of
responsible Turkish authorities should the documents be provided to the Panel
were not entirely credible.38
Ultimately, the Panel decided that ‘ in the absence of any rebutting evidence
provided by Turkey, it is appropriate for this Panel to draw the appropriate in-
ferences, as the United States has suggested on several occasions during this dis-
pute’.39 Interestingly, the Panel used the term ‘adverse inferences’ in its interim
report but was persuaded by the United States to substitute ‘appropriate in-
ferences ’. The United States’ reasoning for demanding such a change is not per-
suasive; the United States simply notes that ‘adverse inferences ’ appears only in
Annex V, paragraphs 7–8 of the SCM Agreement, and suggests that an ‘appro-
priate ’ inference should be drawn from Turkey’s failure to provide evidence sup-
porting its arguments.40 The United States should rather have alleged to standing
WTO jurisprudence in US–Wheat Gluten,41 in which the Appellate Body rejected
the Complainant’s arguments suggesting that the Panel erred in not drawing ‘ad-
verse ’ inferences simply from the Respondent’s refusal to provide certain infor-
mation requested from it by the Panel. The Panel gives no further insight into
motivation to initially use the term ‘adverse’ inferences ; here, in contrast to its
resistance to other suggested US changes in the interim report, the Panel simply
acquiesces in the use of the softer ‘appropriate ’ inferences terminology.42
36 Ibid., para. 7.87.
37 Ibid., para. 7.93.
38 Ibid., paras. 7.97–7.100.
39 Ibid., paras. 7.106–7.107.
40 Ibid., para. 5.18.
41 AB Report, US–Wheat Gluten (DS 166, at paras. 168–174).
42 Panel Report, Turkey–Rice, para. 5.20.
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US concerns with Panel overreaching also relate to the parties’ alleged ‘duty to
collaborate’ with the Panel in its exercise of authority to seek information under
DSU Article 13.1. The United States suggested that references in the interim report
to a ‘rule of collaboration’ by the disputing parties be deleted, asserting that the
DSU does not provide for such a rule. The Panel disagreed, arguing that the lan-
guage in Article 13.1 stating that ‘a Member should respond promptly and fully to
any request by a Panel for such information as the Panel considers necessary and
appropriate ’ is a suﬃcient basis for its rule of collaboration.43 However, the Panel
modiﬁed the language in the ﬁnal report, stating that Members have ‘committed to
collaborate’44 as quoted above.
3.3 Legal analysis : interpreting Agreement on Agriculture,
Article 4.2 and Note 1
An interesting aspect of the Panel’s analysis is that the entire burden-of-proof
discussion takes place within the factual analysis, while the legal analysis is com-
pletely removed from the factual examination. This approach results in a complete
parallelism and sequencing of factual and legal analyses. True, the Panel ﬁrst had
to deﬁne what the measure at issue was and whether it actually existed – i.e.,
whether Turkey was systematically denying licenses – before it could consider
whether doing so was inconsistent.45
However, what the Panel then does in its legal interpretation could be perceived
as partially undermining its previous meticulous factual examination: First, in its
legal analysis, the Panel examines the intent and purpose of Turkey’s measure.46
One wonders whether this is advisable or necessary. If Panels engage in intent-
driven analyses or even start questioning parties’ good-faith behavior, this may do
the dispute settlement system a great disservice. Second, in the course of its legal
analysis the Panel states : ‘even if a number of Certiﬁcates had been approved, that
would not nullify the fact that a decision was adopted to suspend at times the
concession of Certiﬁcates to import rice outside the TRQ’.47 Given that, in order to
prove the existence of the measure at issue, the lynchpin of the United States’
oﬀense was to prove that there was a consistent and methodical rejection policy in
place, this strikes us as a counter-intuitive statement. Third, the Panel states that
‘ the challenged measure does not aﬀect the level of duties, but rather the quantities
of product [sic] that can enter the Turkish market_ Even without any systematic
intention to restrict the importation of rice_ the lack of transparency and of
43 Ibid., paras. 5.14–5.16.
44 Ibid., para. 7.1.
45 Indeed, the outcome of the factual analysis was that Turkey had in place a policy to deny
Certiﬁcates for rice imports outside the TRQ from September 2003 onwards.
46 Ibid., paras. 7.113 and 7.117.
47 Ibid., para. 7.117, emphasis added.
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predictability of Turkey’s issuance of Certiﬁcates to import rice is similarly liable
to restrict the volume of imports. ’48
There is an apparent circularity in the Panel’s logic here: The ﬁrst sentence starts
out by asserting that the challenged measure aﬀects the quantities of products
entering the Turkish market; the last sentence closes the logical chain by stating
that the lack of transparency and predictability is liable to restrict the volume
of imports. The Panel eﬀectively asserts that regardless of the purpose of the
Certiﬁcates, they are liable to restrict trade.49 Basically, the Panel ﬁnds that the
mere decision to suspend at times some Certiﬁcates is likely to aﬀect quantities
through the lack of transparency and predictability that results. However, the
rationale for this conclusion is suﬃciently incomplete as to call into question the
Panel’s previous analysis. Was it the mere decision to restrict the issuance of
Certiﬁcates (i.e., the ‘ letters of acceptance’) that established an illegality, or was it
the actual conduct by Turkey?
The essence of the United States’ argument was that Turkey’s Certiﬁcates were
eﬀectively being used as a discretionary import licensing system in violation of the
AoA and GATT Article XI:1. Turkey countered that the Certiﬁcates were simply
administrative forms used for customs purposes and that they had been ‘system-
atically and regularly approved on a non-discriminatory basis ’.50
Article 4.2 of the Agreement on Agriculture states that:
Members shall not maintain, resort to, or revert to any measures of the kind
which have been required to be converted into ordinary customs duties,1 except
as otherwise provided for in Article 5 and Annex 5.
The documentation the United States had provided included rejected Certiﬁcate
applications; motions and other documents related to procedures before Turkish
courts ; various documents related to reasons advanced by Turkey for the rejec-
tions; documents in which the government recommended temporary suspensions
of granting of Certiﬁcates ; and the earlier-mentioned letter to the USTR advising
that Certiﬁcates would be issued as of 1 April 2006. The United States asserted that
such evidence demonstrated that Turkey had maintained a legal prohibition and
restriction on rice imports based on a discretionary process of approving
48 Ibid., para. 7.120, emphasis added.
49 Ibid., para. 7.129.
50 Ibid., paras. 7.12–7.19.
1 These measures include quantitative import restrictions, variable import levies, minimum import
prices, discretionary import licensing, non-tariﬀ measures maintained through state-trading
enterprises, voluntary export restraints, and similar border measures other than ordinary customs
duties, whether or not the measures are maintained under country-speciﬁc derogations from the
provisions of GATT 1947, but not measures maintained under balance-of-payments provisions or
under other general, non-agriculture-speciﬁc provisions of GATT 1994 or of the other Multilateral
Trade Agreements in Annex 1A to the WTO Agreement (emphasis added).
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Certiﬁcates.51 According to the Panel, Turkey did not dispute the ‘veracity’ of the
documents, but characterized the rejections as individual rather than systematic,
pointing out that the overwhelming majority of Certiﬁcates were approved
straightaway, and most resubmitted ones after revision.52
The Panel was not convinced by Turkey’s aﬃrmations. It pointed to evi-
dence that MARA’s general directorate had ‘repeatedly and periodically’ issued
recommendations to MARA to temporarily suspend the granting of Certiﬁcates
for rice importation over various periods.53 Was this a ‘measure ’ that was required
under the AoA to be converted to ordinary customs duties? Yes, it was. In addition
to the facts developed earlier, the Panel noted that one of the justiﬁcations given by
Turkish authorities for the suspension of approval of Certiﬁcates was ‘as an in-
strument to assure the absorption of local rice production’.54 As the Panel con-
cluded:
[W]e consider that there is suﬃcient evidence regarding the manner in which,
from September 2003 and for diﬀerent periods of time, Turkey has denied or
failed to grant Certiﬁcates of Control to import rice outside of the tariﬀ rate
quota, to characterize this measure as a quantitative import restriction. Through
this practice, the Turkish authorities have restricted the importation of rice for
periods of time. This conduct can, therefore, be considered as a measure of the
kind which have been required to be converted into ordinary customs duties
under Article 4.2 of the Agreement on Agriculture.55
The Panel then discussed the issue of whether the Turkish measure was a ‘dis-
cretionary import licensing’ scheme. The Panel agreed with the United States,
based on the same facts, that the measure was a ‘practice of ‘‘discretionary import
licensing’’ that was required to be converted into ordinary customs duties under
Article 4.2 of the Agreement on Agriculture’.56 On grounds of judicial economy,
the Panel declined to render an additional ﬁnding on GATT Article XI:1.
3.4 Legal analysis : the Domestic Purchase Requirement for ‘ in-quota ’
imports and GATT Article III:4
There was no disagreement between the Parties as to the existence of a law or
regulation that importers purchase domestic rice as a condition of enjoying fa-
vorable customs duties on rice imported under the tariﬀ-rate quotas, or that im-
ported and domestic rice were ‘ like products’. The Panel therefore concluded that
the measure was ‘a requirement aﬀecting the internal sale, oﬀering for sale, pur-
chase and use of imported rice, within the meaning of Article III :4 of the GATT
51 Panel Report, Turkey–Rice, paras. 7.61–7.64.
52 Ibid., paras. 7.63–7.75.
53 Ibid., para. 7.80.
54 Ibid., para. 7.113.
55 Ibid., para. 7.121.
56 Ibid., paras. 7.122, 7.134.
Rice Age: Comments on Turkey–Rice 157
at https:/www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/S1474745608004205
Downloaded from https:/www.cambridge.org/core. University of Basel Library, on 11 Jul 2017 at 16:39:46, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, available
1994’.57 The issue for the Panel was thus whether the requirement resulted in less
favorable treatment of imported rice. The disputing parties held contrasting views
on the economic attractiveness for operators in Turkey to import rice under the
TRQ. While Turkey stipulated an advantage to importers (and indirectly to ex-
porting countries) due to lower-than-MFN tariﬀs for imported rice, the United
States contended that ‘ the large cost associated with domestic purchase more than
oﬀsets any alleged cost saving resulting from the preferential rates of duty realized
by importers under the TQR’.58
The Panel found it irrelevant whether or not importers of rice ultimately beneﬁt
from the TQR. Instead, it looked for guidance at the jurisprudence in Korea–Beef,
in which the Appellate Body directed that the assessment of less favorable treat-
ment should focus on determining ‘whether a measure modiﬁes the conditions
of competition in the relevant market to the detriment of imported products ’.59
According to the Panel:
compliance with the domestic purchase requirement was a necessary condition to
beneﬁt from access to the TRQ. Purchase of like imported rice did not grant the
same beneﬁt_ [T]he domestic purchase requirement modiﬁed the conditions
of competition in the Turkish market to the detriment of imported rice. The
purchase of domestic rice accorded an advantage that the purchase of the like
imported product did not, i.e., the option to buy imported rice at reduced tariﬀ
rates.60
In other words, the Panel found that purchase of domestic rice accorded an ad-
vantage to operators vis-a`-vis that of imported rice solely through the option of
being able to import rice at reduced tariﬀ rates. Because this unequal treatment
resulted in less favorable treatment of imported rice, the Panel established the
presence of a violation of Article III :4.
We acknowledge that we are somewhat skeptical about the Panel’s way of
constructing discrimination between the imported and domestic like product. If
Turkey, for whatever reasons, were to enact a TRQ that had a domestic purchase
requirement component, yet would indubitably beneﬁt both domestic producers
and exporting countries, it would still be illegal according to the Panel’s in-
terpretation. Suppose the following design of an out-of-quota regime
x=pw(1+t1)q1,
where pw is the world price for rice, t1 is the MFN import tariﬀ for rice, q1 the
import quantity, and x the value of rice imports. Now suppose that Turkey came
57 Ibid., para. 7.226.
58 Ibid., para. 7.236.
59 Ibid., para. 7.231, quoting Appellate Body Report, Korea –Measures Aﬀecting Imports of Fresh,
Chilled and Frozen Beef, WT/DS161/AB/R, WT/DS169/AB/R, adopted 10 January 2001, DSR 2001:I, 5,
para. 137.
60 Ibid., paras. 7.233–7.234.
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up with a TRQ at reduced tariﬀs (t1/2), which satisﬁed the following criteria:
pw(1+t1/2)q2+pDqD=x
such that q2>q1 and pDqDi0
With pDqD as the local purchase requirement, this TRQ system would have a
solution for every pw and at least some import quantities q1. Hence, for the same
value, Turkey would import no less under the new TRQ and at the same time the
importer would satisfy some local purchase of rice, without harming local con-
sumers. What constitutes tariﬀ revenues to the government under the current im-
port regime would just be reallocated between importers, exporters, and
consumers under the alternative scenario.
We fail to see any discrimination in this arrangement, yet under the Turkey–Rice
jurisprudence, such a TQR regime would be deemed illegal, because domestic rice
would still be granted the option to import at reduced tariﬀs.
3.5 Legal analysis : the domestic purchase requirement in conjunction
with the denial to grant licenses
In addition to its separate claims against the domestic purchase requirement for in-
quota imports and the denial to grant licenses to import over-quota rice, the
United States in its request for the establishment of a Panel, also raised claims
against both measures conjointly, claiming that these measures working in com-
bination are inconsistent with Arts. X.1 of the GATT, 4.2 of the AoA, and 1.6 of
the Import Licensing Agreement (ILA).61 For reasons of judicial economy, the
Panel refrained from an analysis of this point, contending that each of the two
measures individually has been found illegal, and that two wrongs acting in
concert cannot be expected to be consistent with Turkey’s obligations under the
covered Agreements.62
4. Legal and economic aspects of the report
Leaving aside Turkey’s rather dismal and desolate defense, the Turkey–Rice case
oﬀers some interesting legal and economic aspects of a more general nature.
4.1 Burden of proof, evidence, collaboration, inference, and sequence
of events
As stated above,63 the United States reacted to the Panel’s interim report by re-
questing a signiﬁcant change in the burden-of-proof language of the original report
text. The interim report had stated that evidence provided by both litigating parties
should be considered when deciding whether the United States as Complainant
61 Ibid., paras. 7.273–7.275.
62 Ibid., paras. 7.278–7.281.
63 See footnote 31 and accompanying text.
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suﬃciently raised its preliminary presumption that Turkey had engaged in the
measures at issue, and that a failure by Turkey to rebut the existence of a measure
at issue would be followed by a legal examination whether the facts so dem-
onstrated could be qualiﬁed as a WTO-inconsistent measure.64 The United States
opined that the burden of bringing legal and factual prima facie evidence should
reside exclusively with the complaining party, and hence demanded a drastic
change in the language for purposes of the ﬁnal report.65 As a reason for its request,
the United States claimed that it wanted to avoid possible misinterpretations of the
rules on burden of proof: The sole responsibility to successfully construct a prima
facie case should always reside with the complaining party.66
To our mind, this somewhat altruistic argumentation is a thinly veiled ﬁg leaf for
the United States’ principal objective behind its proposed change of wording. It
seems much more likely that the United States wanted to promote and establish
its concept of how the litigation process before the Panel was to be conducted.
Figure 1A illustrates what we believe to be the United States’ preferred litigation
process.
The United States proposes a very clear linearity in its concept of the litigation
process, where the Complainant’s burden of proof (BoP) consists in establishing a
prima facie case. Notice that legal and factual input stems solely from the com-
plaining party (C). In case this exercise is successfully completed (it must be if
refutation by the Respondent is impossible), the burden of proof shifts to the re-
sponding party (‘R’ in Figure 1A), who submits legal and factual evidence in its
rebuttal submission. After this, the Panel in its objective assessment bestowed by it
under DSU 11 must decide whether the facts as demonstrated by the Complainant
can be qualiﬁed as constituting an illegal measure. After weighing and balancing
the evidence at hand, the Panel reaches its ﬁnding.
64 The interim Panel Report read in pertinent parts (ibid., para. 5.9; emphasis added): ‘In order to
assess whether the United States has met its initial burden, the Panel will accordingly consider if the
evidence on the record, as submitted by both parties, is suﬃcient to raise a preliminary presumption that
Turkey has engaged in the denial, or failure to grant, licences to import rice outside of the tariﬀ rate quota.
Only if [all] the evidence on the record supported such a presumption, would the burden then be shifted
onto Turkey to adequately rebut it. If the United States were successful in raising that preliminary pre-
sumption, and Turkey failed to rebut it, the Panel would then consider whether the facts so demonstrated
can be qualiﬁed as constituting a border measure of the kind which has been required to be converted into
ordinary customs duties by the Agreement on Agriculture.’
65 The United States proposed the following text in lieu of the Panel’s wording (ibid., para. 5.10;
emphasis added): ‘In order to assess whether the United States has met its initial burden, the Panel will
accordingly consider if the United States has provided evidence and argumentation on the record, suf-
ﬁcient to establish that Turkey has engaged in the denial, or failure to grant, licences to import rice outside
of the tariﬀ rate quota. Only if the United States has provided evidence and argumentation on the record
suﬃcient to make out a prima facie case, would the burden then be shifted onto Turkey to adequately
rebut the US allegations. If the United States were successful in establishing its prima facie case, and
Turkey failed to rebut it, the Panel would then consider whether the United States has established that the
facts so demonstrated can be qualiﬁed as constituting a border measure of the kind which has been
required to be converted into ordinary customs duties by the Agreement on Agriculture.’
66 See supra at note 33 and accompanying text.
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Given that Turkey eﬀectively stonewalled the process by completely failing to
deliver any relevant facts in its defense, the United States’ perception of the liti-
gation process seemed straightforward – from the perspective of the United States.
As Figure 1B shows, according to the United States’ linear concept of the litigation
process, an ineﬀective rebuttal by the Respondent basically ends the process
prematurely. The Panel draws ‘appropriate ’ inferences and the case is closed in
favor of the complaining party.
The US view of the litigation process likely reﬂects the legal culture of the
common-law system (with the availability of discovery) as adapted to a Panel
process that is basically a civil-law system without much discovery but with some
history of a more activist judiciary, and with the added complexity of the need to
seek relevant factual information from a possibly noncooperative sovereign
government. Yet, the Panel accepted neither the United States’ requests for changes
in the language of the report, nor the linearity and unidimensionality of the United
States’ preferred litigation. Instead, the Panelists brought forth their own concept
of the litigation process. Citing the Panel’s duty under Art. 11 of the DSU to ‘make
an objective assessment of the matter before it, including an objective assessment
of the facts of the case ’, the Panel opined that it had the obligation to consider
Figure 1B. Ineﬀective rebuttal in the United States’ version of
a litigation process
Prima facie
• Measure at issue
• Legal basis
• Legal argumentation
• Evidence
Rebuttal
DSU 11
• Objective assessment
• Weighing and balancing
Findingshift of BoP
C R
“appropriate inference”
Figure 1A. The litigation process according to the United States
Prima facie
• Measure at issue
• Legal basis
• Legal argumentation
• Evidence
Rebuttal
• Legal argumentation
• Evidence
• Factual argumentation
DSU 11
• Objective assessment
• Weighing and balancing
Findingshift of BoP
C R
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for the prima facie examination all the facts of the case (as submitted by both
parties and those procured by the Panel itself under its broad authority of Art. 13
DSU). In a nutshell, the Panel’s version of the litigation process is that illustrated in
Figure 2.67
As noted above, the Panel in Turkey–Rice essentially partitioned the litigation
process into two constituent parts: a factual analysis and a legal assessment.68 The
Panel made clear that for the Complainant to satisfy its prima facie case of in-
consistency of a measure with a provision of the WTO covered agreements, it is
not solely responsible for the production of all facts raised in relation to the issue at
hand. Rather, it is appropriate for the Panel to draw on factual evidence laid out by
both litigating parties, Complainant and Respondent alike. Once a Panel is satis-
ﬁed that the measure at issue has actually occurred, the burden of proof shifts to
the responding party.
According to the Panel, if the Respondent is unable or unwilling to produce
satisfactory rebuttal evidence, the litigation process is not over by default – in
contrast to the United States’ version of litigation process (Figures 1A and 1B,
above). Rather, the Panel has the obligation, or at least the discretion, under DSU
Articles 11 and 13.1, to launch a parallel process in which it seeks additional
information and technical advice from any individual or body within the
two litigating countries.69 Although both litigating parties are under a duty and
Figure 2. The litigation process according to the Panel in Turkey–Rice
Prima facie
• Measure at issue
• Legal basis
• Legal argumentation
• Evidence
Legal analysis
• Is measure at issue illegal?
• Weighing and balancing
Finding
shift of BoP
C R
R
Panel requests
C R
Factual analysis
• What is the measure at issue?
• Has it occurred?
Duty to collaborate with the Panel
Rebuttal
• Legal argumentation
• Evidence
• Factual argumentation
67 Evidence for the Panel’s version of the litigation process can be found in paras. 5.12, 5.16–5.17,
7.1–7.11, and 7.59–7.60 of the Panel Report.
68 Whether this dichotomy of factual and legal assessment is unique to the circumstances of the case at
hand, we cannot say. To be sure, Turkey–Rice is a very fact-intensive case with little legal ﬁnessing. Turkey
has not resorted to exceptions, but just denied the existence of the measure at issue.
69 Ibid., para. 7.1.
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obligation to respond promptly and fully to requests for information made by
Panels at that point in the litigation process,70 refusal to cooperate by any party
will only be ‘one of the relevant facts of record, and indeed an important fact, to be
taken into account in determining the appropriate inference to be drawn’.71 The
Panel will draw ‘appropriate inferences’ not solely in light of the refusal to coop-
erate, but in light of and in connection with all other available evidence on the
record.72
Once the Panel – after its objective assessment of the facts – is of the opinion
that the Complainant was successful in raising its preliminary presumption and the
responding party failed to rebut it, the Panel moves on to conduct its legal analysis.
It assesses whether the facts so demonstrated can be qualiﬁed as constituting a
violation of WTO law.73 The outﬂow of this weighing and balancing mechanism is
the Panel’s ﬁndings in form of rulings and recommendations. Once again, we see in
the Panel’s approach (and perhaps in DSU Articles 11 and 13.1 as well) the inﬂu-
ence of a civil-law litigation system in which the judges have considerably more
ﬂexibility to seek out factual information on their own, without relying more or
less exclusively on the ‘adversarial ’ approach used in the common-law system to
develop the facts.
Next to the litigation scenario brought forth by the United States, and that
applied by the Panel in Turkey–Rice, we can see a third variant of how the DSB
litigation process can be interpreted. We are here motivated by the Rice Panel’s
own words:
In our view, the duty that a Panel has, under Article 11 of the DSU, to ‘make an
objective assessment of the matter before it, including an objective assessment of
the facts of the case’, implies that the Panel is bound to consider all the evidence
on record, which includes the evidence submitted by the parties and that pro-
cured by the Panel itself under its broad authority ‘ to seek information and
technical advice from any individual or body which it deems appropriate ’ in the
terms of Article 13.1 of the DSU. As noted by the Appellate Body in US–Wheat
Gluten, ‘under Article 11 of the DSU, a Panel must draw inferences on the basis
of all of the facts of record relevant to the particular determination to be made ’
[footnote omitted]. A Panel’s duty to consider all available evidence on record
does not relieve the complaining party of its burden to make a prima facie case
that a challenged measure is inconsistent with the WTO agreements by putting
forward adequate legal arguments and evidence. Indeed, in the lack of adequate
70 Ibid., para. 7.10, citing relevant Appellate Body jurisdiction from Canada–Aircraft (para. 187) and
US–Wheat Gluten (para. 174).
71 Ibid., para. 7.10, citing the Appellate Body in US–Wheat Gluten (para. 174; emphasis added).
72 This would explain why the Panel so readily altered its language from ‘adverse’ to ‘appropriate’
inferences at the request of the United States (see supra at fn. 40). To wit, the Panel really did not want to
draw adverse inference in the sense of stop-gapping the litigation, rather it wished to take Turkey’s
recalcitrance as one (albeit important) fact at hand.
73 Ibid., paras. 5.9 and 7.60.
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legal arguments and evidence to sustain its claim, the Panel would have to con-
clude that the complaining party has failed to make a prima facie case.74
Figure 3 illustrates how we understand the operation of this third variant of the
litigation process, and how it diﬀers from the previous two alternatives.
In contrast to the Panel’s actual conduct in Turkey–Rice (Figure 2), the litigation
process in this scenario is no longer divided into a sequence of factual and legal
components. The Complainant brings a case in which it speciﬁes the measures at
issue and the legal basis for its allegations, adduces factual evidence, and brings
forth a coherent legal argumentation. However, in contrast to the previous two
scenarios, the Panel here draws on evidence from both litigating parties to assess
the strength of the Complainant’s prima facie case. Giving eﬀect to the quotation
above, the Panel can already make an objective assessment of the facts at hand.
Using its discretion to request additional information from the parties at any point
in time during the litigation process (vested to the Panel by DSU Article 13.1), and
mindful of its right to seek outside information and opinion (DSU Article 13.2),
the Panel will be able to make autonomous inferences as to whether the
Complainant has satisﬁed its prima facie case.75
Figure 3. A third alternative of interpreting the litigation process
Prima facie
• Measure at issue
• Legal basis
• Legal argumentation
• Evidence
Rebuttal
• Evidence
• Factual argumentation
• Legal argumentation
Panel analysis
• Objective assessment (DSU 11)
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• Outside information (DSU 13.2)
• Autonomous inference
Finding
shift of BoP
C R C R
Panel analysis
• Objective assessment (DSU 11)
• Request for information (DSU 13.1)
• Outside information (DSU 13.2)
• Autonomous inference
Duty to collaborate with the Panel
74 Ibid., para. 5.12; emphasis added.
75 Note that in contrast to the ‘Panel scenario’, both litigating parties are already under the obligation
to collaborate at this stage.
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In the event the Panel – in light of the facts at hand – is satisﬁed by the
Complainant’s submission of evidence and legal reasoning, the burden of proof
will shift to the responding party. The Respondent is charged with the production
and submission of exonerative factual evidence and adequate legal reasoning. The
Panel can make use of its discretion again to request further clarifying information
and necessary evidence from both litigants. Should it deem it pertinent, the Panel
may seek outside advice by experts, international organizations, or Member
governments under its right bestowed by Art. 13.2 DSU. The Panel’s ﬁndings
generated in the entire process will then ﬂow into its rulings and recommendations.
It could be argued that the burden of proof should be discarded altogether in this
scenario of a trade dispute, since an active Panel does not need this procedural
straw man to do its job. The litigation process then would just be a bifurcated
procedure where parties make their submissions (oral, written, answers to Panel)
and the Panel conducts its independent deliberations. Figure 4 illustrates this ap-
proach.
However, we strongly disagree with the contention that burden of proof is a
futile concept in the Panel process. To our mind, the Panel’s role is not in the ﬁrst
instance to ﬁnd the truth, but to assess which party’s contentions are correct (or
more reasonable). The burden of proof is thereby an immensely important tool ; it
directs the Panel’s attention to certain issues, and limits the complaining party in
making frivolous, unfounded, or excessive allegations. Requiring that the party
which makes a positive allegation to provide proof of such accusation, and asking
the responding party to rebut it is an eﬃcient and commonly accepted element of
litigation. It is also essential in a system in which the Panel cannot compel the
Figure 4.
Parties’ subm issions
• M easure at issue
• Legal basis
• Legal argum entation
• Factual argumentation
• Evidence
F inding
C R
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cooperation of the respondent in providing relevant information that is often to-
tally within the respondent’s knowledge and control, as is well-illustrated in the
instant proceeding.
This third scenario of litigation breaks open the linearity of the previous two
alternatives. All through the litigation, the Panel’s weighing and balancing is an
integral part, but not the ﬁnal step in the process. Objective panel assessment runs
in perfect parallel to the parties’ submissions and testimonials. The dispute Panel is
certainly more proactive and arguably more interventionist or intrusive than in the
other two scenarios. We will call the US interpretation of the litigation process the
‘low-involvement’ scenario (‘Scenario 1’), the Panel’s interpretation the ‘medium-
involvement’ alternative (‘Scenario 2’), and our own interpretation the ‘high-
involvement’ or ‘activist ’ scenario (‘Scenario 3’).
4.1.1 An assessment of the scenarios of the litigation process
It seems rather obvious that the three scenarios of the litigation process diﬀer
strikingly both in practice and in outcome. Without claiming to be comprehensive,
we compare the three scenarios on the basis of a few criteria.
First, from the point of view of strategic gamesmanship, the three described
scenarios provide the disputing parties with diﬀerent strategic incentives of
whether and when to disclose and submit relevant information to the Panel. Under
the low-involvement Scenario 1 (Figures 1A and 1B), the litigation process is not
only linear, but also organized in a fashion that game theorists would call a
‘sequential game’. In order to raise the preliminary presumption of a WTO vio-
lation, the Complainant supplies evidence to the Panel. Thereafter, it falls upon the
Respondent to supply information.76 This nonsimultaneous setup of the litigation
game gives the Respondent a substantial strategic edge over the complaining party.
Knowing the basis for the other party’s actions, the former can optimally shape
its argumentation according to the latter’s allegation and evidence, and submit
eclectic facts tailored to the previous prima facie material.77
In a medium-involvement Scenario 2 world (Figure 2), the sequential nature of
Scenario 1 is partially alleviated: The Panel will adduce evidence submitted by the
Respondent in its evaluation of the prima facie case. Hence, the Respondent has a
vital interest in providing information aimed at invalidating the Complainant’s
factual evidence that the measure at issue has actually been implemented by the
Respondent. However, given that the Respondent is under no obligation to col-
laborate from the beginning of the proceedings,78 it again has a strong strategic
76 We are aware of the fact that respondent and Complainant hand in their ﬁrst written submissions
(FWS) simultaneously. However, the respondent can still choose to submit eclectic information in its FWS
and provide more information during the oral hearing sessions.
77 Imagine that the well-known ‘Rock, Paper, Scissors’ game were to be played sequentially. Knowing
what Player 1 has chosen gives Player 2 an undeniable advantage (and would presumably deprive the game
of any fun).
78 See Panel Report, Turkey–Rice, at para. 7.7 (citing the Panel on Argentina–Textiles, para. 6.40;
emphasis added): ‘ It is often said that the idea of peaceful settlement of disputes before international
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incentive to hold back important private information until such information either
becomes pertinent or is requested by the Panel after the Respondent has submitted
its rebuttal.
Under an activist Panel (Scenario 3; Figure 3), in substantial contrast, the liti-
gating parties face not only a more active panel process but also the strategic setup
that more resembles a ‘simultaneous game’. Parties will likely ﬁnd it more useful
to submit evidence early on in the process, since the Panel reserves its right in any
event to question them at any time of the process, but also since the Panel may also
rely upon outside expertise to get a more comprehensive idea of the facts of the
case.
Second, the Scenarios diﬀer in the way they deal with ‘stonewalling’ : A refusal
to supply the Panel with private information is never a good idea, as Turkey–Rice
clearly has demonstrated. Since it is impossible not to communicate, snubbing the
Panel in the way Turkey did will never be seen favorably under any of the above
scenarios. The Panelists will be indignant and draw their inferences accordingly.
But what if the Respondent really cannot adduce the evidence requested?79
Under Scenario 1, such a case is lost for the Respondent. In contrast, under
Scenario 2 the Panel will take this circumstance into consideration as one salient
factor among others to consider. In a Scenario-3 world, the Panel will actively
address the information glitch and seek outside advice and input. Armed with
more informational ammunition than under Scenario 2, the Panel – arguably –
will be able to make more balanced decisions under Scenario 3, assuming, of
course, that the relevant information exists and can be acquired by the Panel.
This brings us to the next point: factﬁnding and autonomous inference. Under
Scenario 1 (and probably Scenario 2 as well), Panels are quite reluctant to venture
out on factﬁnding missions. Independent factﬁnding is a factor missed in
Turkey–Rice, given that this fact-heavy case had considerable room for indepen-
dent Panel inference. Even after reading the Turkey–Rice report several times, the
authors were still very unclear regarding key factual issues, their salience for
the case at hand, and the way they interact. For example, who was responsible
for the massive price hikes in the Turkish rice market – speculators, importers,
or the TMO?80 What is the interrelationship of the various Turkish agencies
TMO, FTU, and MARA? Did Turkey discriminate only against US rice, or was
there a blanket prohibition vis-a`-vis other countries as well? A more active Panel
tribunals is largely based on the premise of co-operation of the litigating parties. In this context the most
important result of the rule of collaboration appears to be that the adversary is obligated to provide the
tribunal with relevant documents which are in its sole possession. This obligation does not arise until the
claimant has done its best to secure evidence and has actually produced some prima facie evidence in
support of its case. ’
79 TheUS–Gambling (Article 22.6) arbitration comes to mind, in which Antigua and Barbuda claimed
not to have any data on its GDP or its trade balance in services (US – Measures Aﬀecting the Cross-Border
Supply of Gambling and Betting Services, WT/DS285/ARB, circulated 21 December 2007).
80 Cf. Panel Report, Turkey–Rice, para. 2.27.
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under Scenario 3 could have dug into the issue and possibly answered some of
these and other salient questions.
Fourth, an important aspect in which Scenarios 1–3 diﬀer is that of ‘correlation
vs. causality’. Given the scant factual situation under which the Panel was oper-
ating, the United States constructed its prima facie case around rather sketchy
evidence: It alleged a causal link between the Turkish Minister of Agriculture’s
receipt of a recommendation to suspend temporarily the granting of Certiﬁcates of
Control and the rejection of Certiﬁcates for a handful of US imports. The Panel
correctly stated that ‘merely because two facts coincide in time, it does not auto-
matically lead to the conclusion’ that a prohibition of US imports is proven.81
However, the Panel did not test for causality and instead moved to assess further
circumstantial evidence.82 Amore active Scenario-3 Panel might have attempted to
examine more closely the possible causality between ‘letters of acceptance’ and
rejections of Certiﬁcates for over-quota imports. Doing so, however, is only
possible if the Panel takes it upon itself to look for additional evidence and factual
inter-linkages.
The choice among Scenarios 1, 2, and 3 is very clearly a tradeoﬀ between ex-
panded Panel involvement in the factﬁnding process (some may call it intrusiveness
or hyperactivity) and traditional arbitrating. We see considerable advantages for
Scenario 3 if accuracy and completeness are among the highest priorities for the
system, although we fully recognize that some Members are likely to oppose it as
interventionist Panel behavior, overreaching, judicial insolence, or a practice that
makes the Panel process more time-consuming, more expensive, and less predict-
able for the Complainant. Common-law Members, whose lawyers are trained to
believe that the judge in most litigated disputes should rely solely or almost ex-
clusively on the submissions of the parties and possibly upon amicus curiae briefs,
are probably less likely to favor Scenario 3 than those Members with a civil-law
tradition. There, the activism of the judges in adducing evidence is more generally
accepted, and in some ‘code’ jurisdictions, including the European Court of
Justice, advocates generally exercise broad functions,83 so that the parties are
not expected to have a monopoly on the facts and legal theories placed before the
court.
From a process point of view, a more activist Panel system would incur higher
costs, both in terms of the time required to complete reports and ﬁnancial expense
for both the WTO and for the disputing Parties if outside experts are retained
to supply the Panel with information not made available by the disputing
Parties. Among some WTO Members, there is a general lack of conﬁdence in
the competence and independence of Panelists, a concern that would likely
81 Ibid., para. 7.77.
82 Ibid., para. 7.80.
83 See Hartley (2007) (discussing the function of advocates general, based on the French system, to
make reasoned, independent submissions to the court in order to assist the court).
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discourage modifying the panel process to grant the Panelists greater powers and
discretion.84 These factors may encourage many civil-law Members to side with
their common-law colleagues against more active Panel factﬁnding. In other
words, we recognize that there may be less than a groundswell of support for the
change we are proposing!
In our view, the most signiﬁcant additional advantage of Scenario 3 is that it
makes strategic withholding of information less desirable for litigating parties.
Scenario 3 is the most inclusive of the three alternatives. The Panel eﬀectively has
discretion for a more reticent approach and does not necessarily have to go on
factﬁnding missions, particularly where all parties cooperate in providing neces-
sary factual information promptly. However, in a world where Scenario 3 is a
recognized option for the Panel, subject to its discretion, disputing Parties will not
know ex ante which ‘type’ of Panel approach they will face. This makes strategic
retention of information relatively less attractive ex ante. Hence, litigants can be
expected to be more forthcoming with information right from the get-go of the
litigation, even if they realize that most Panels will not resort to Scenario 3 unless
the Respondent is stonewalling or presents an incomplete factual record. Whether
this tips the balance for most Members as a dispute settlement policy matter is
something we cannot determine.
4.1.2 Support for Scenario 3 from the L&E literature on ‘Judicial Activism ’
In addition to the above points, we ﬁnd strong support for Panel involvement
along the lines of Scenario 3 from the literature on ‘judicial activism’: this rela-
tively novel strand of law-and-economics (L&E) research examines the interplay
between the design of contracts and the nature and degree of court involvement.85
The literature on ‘judicial activism’ in trade-dispute resolution is based on two
fundamental premises :
. First, trade agreements, such as the WTO, are inherently incomplete contracts in
the sense that they do not specify with certainty all states of nature (future con-
ditions, or contingencies).86 In other words, a deﬁning feature of incomplete
84 For example, the United States and Chile have submitted a paper to theWTO calling, inter alia, ‘ for
ensuring that the members of panels have appropriate expertise to appreciate the issues presented in a
dispute’. ‘Negotiations on Improvements and Clariﬁcations of the Dispute Settlement Understanding,
Contribution by Chile and the United States on Improving Flexibility and Member Control in WTO
Dispute Settlement’, available at www.ustr.gov/assets/Trade_Agreements/Monitoring_Enforcement/
Dispute_Settlement/US_Papers_on_Dispute_Settlement/asset_upload_ﬁle567_7701.pdf(lastvisited29July
2008), para. (e)).
85 See generally Anderlini et al. (2006), Shavell (2006), Anderlini et al. (2007). For the special case of
multilateral trade agreements, see Battigalli and Maggi (2003), Horn et al. (2005), Bustos (2007), WTO
(2007: section II.D.3), Keck and Schropp (2008), Maggi and Staiger (2008), Schropp (2009: chapters 4
and 5).
86 Prior to the conclusion of the Agreement, countries do not possess full knowledge of the nature,
probability of occurrence, and/or impact of future contingencies, or of the possible trade policies and
instruments that their trade partners might concoct: asymmetrical information settings, uncertainty over
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contracts is that they contain gaps: Compared to the contracting ideal of the
complete contingent contract (CCC),87 important contingencies are not exhaus-
tively and unambiguously speciﬁed ex ante, i.e. at the time of the conclusion of the
contract. The presence of contractual gaps give rise to one (or indeed a combi-
nation) of three contractual shortcomings:
(i) Vagueness : Contractual gaps can play out in the form of vague language,
i.e. ambiguous and ambivalent contract language, resulting from poorly
described contingencies and their outcomes;88
(ii) Discretion : By this we mean insuﬃcient language that gives contracting
parties too much discretion or maneuvering space. Gaps of this kind are
‘Type-I errors ’ or ‘false positives’. Type-I errors result from the inclusion
of excusable contingencies into the contract, whereby ex post non-
performance does not actually lead to a mutual welfare increase, but
instead opens the ﬂoodgates to opportunistic abuse by the enacting
party;
(iii) Rigidity : Rigidity is the opposite of discretion. Here, the language of the
contract is overtly strict, or rigid. It wrongly prohibits nonperformance in
situations where a complete contingent contract would mandate welfare-
enhancing ex post adjustment (gaps of this sort are ‘Type-II errors ’ or
‘false negatives’).
. The second premise on which L&E approaches to judicial activism are
founded is that dispute settlement is more than simply punishment.89 Whereas
traditional formal economic analysis of trade agreements tends to focus on
the self-enforcement capability of contracting parties,90 various L&E con-
tributions have advocated a more nuanced stance: Keck and Schropp (2008),
future environmental contingencies, bounded rationality, limited resources, or simply mishap – or a mix of
the above – make the WTO an inherently incomplete contract. Schropp (2009: section 4.3) assesses in
detail the sources of contractual incompleteness in the WTO.
87 A Pareto-eﬃcient complete contingent contract makes trade policy contingent on all conceivable
state variables. It is the Arrow–Debreu ideal of a contract that completely informed, perfectly rational
parties would write in absence of any contracting imperfection (such as negotiation costs, costs of infor-
mation gathering, or bounded rationality, see Shavell, 1980: 466), and in the presence of optimal en-
forcement. A CCC is an imaginary, hypothetical contract that provides for a complete description of every
possible present and future state of the world – no matter how small the probability of the contingency.
Therewith, a CCC assigns rights and ownership between parties in every fathomable situation, and spells
out exhaustively and in complete detail the exact legal rights and duties of each party, including the set of
instruments that a signatory may or may not use (Cohen, 1999: 79).
88 Think of ‘catch-all phrases’ and vague contract clauses like ‘best eﬀort’, ‘gross inequity’, ‘ serious
injury’, ‘unforeseen developments’, ‘ like products’, or ‘appropriate countermeasures’. Passages of this
sort can easily be subject to discussion, dispute, and potentially to opportunism. They thus bear the
inherent need for interpretation (Cohen, 1999; Masten, 1999).
89 See, e.g., WTO (2007: section II.C.3) Keck and Schropp (2008), Maggi and Staiger (2008).
90 See Bagwell and Staiger (2002: chapter 6), and Keck and Schropp (2008: section B, and sources
mentioned therein).
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for example, contend that enforcement really is a function of two variables :
enforcement capacity and enforceability, whereby enforcement capacity
is the ability to reciprocate credibly against a violation of the terms of the
contract.91 Enforceability of a contract is another vital determinant of en-
forcement. Typically, issues of observability, veriﬁability, and quantiﬁability
feature prominently when it comes to enforceability.92,93
If one accepts the two axioms of contractual incompleteness and the importance
of enforceability, disputes are to be reckoned with, and thus a clear role for an
independent trade court, or dispute settlement body, emerges: Anticipating that
trade disputes will occur, contracting parties to any trade agreement can be as-
sumed to charge trade courts or dispute panels with completing the various di-
mensions of the incomplete contract. The unachievable CCC, which maximizes
the joint welfare ex ante the occurrence of future contingencies, thereby remains
the normative benchmark.94 Hence, dispute Panels see it as their duty to ﬁll (ex
post) the contractual gap in a way the Pareto-eﬃcient CCC would have prescribed
it (ex ante). This in turn implies that Panels strive for replicating the outcome of
the CCC by looking for those solutions that maximize the joint welfare of all
parties.95
The literature on optimal court behavior now ﬁnds that activist courts that
adjudicate with high accuracy, or quality, can achieve the best results ex post
compared to the benchmark of the complete contingent contract: Activist courts
are thereby courts that diminish obligations when the contract language is too
rigid, add obligations (ﬁll gaps) when the contract lacks appropriate language, and
interpret or clarify passages or terms where the original contract was vague or
ambiguous. Dispute Panels can be said to be of high accuracy, or quality, when
they are engaged in active information-gathering so as to reduce the probability of
issuing wrong rulings.
91 In general, enforcement can be exercised by the aﬀected party itself (self-enforcement), by a neutral
third party, by society at large, or through collective enforcement by a circle of aﬀected or interested
parties (such as the membership of a multilateral contract). Enforcement instruments can be physical
(incarceration), economic (penalty fees), or emotional (reputation loss, withdrawal of aﬀection) measures.
92 By observability the authors mean that contract infringements can be detected in the ﬁrst
place – either by the aﬀected party itself or by a third party (say, an attorney or prosecutor). Veriﬁability,
is concerned with the question whether the contract can actually be enforced as written or agreed upon:
a violation or infringement is veriﬁable if the aﬀected party can point to a clause in the contract and prove
its violation. This presupposes that such a clause is contained in the contract and/or that the violation can
be determined by a neutral third party.Quantiﬁability, ﬁnally, implies that the aggrieved party (or a court)
can quantify the damage incurred as a result of the breach of the contract.
93 As Keck and Schropp (2008 at footnote 25) explain, another – arguably more intuitive – way of
thinking about the two dimensions of enforceability and enforcement capacity is the following: contrac-
tual enforcement always consists of two phases – a litigation phase and a punishment or remediation
phase. The litigation phase is identical to enforceability, while the remediation phase is equivalent to issues
of enforcement capacity.
94 See, e.g., Shavell (1980), Mahlstein and Schropp (2007), or Schropp (2009: section 3.4).
95 Goetz and Scott (1981), Scott (1990), Craswell (1999). See alsoMaggi and Staiger (2008, at fn. 24).
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Since it would go beyond the scope of this paper to review comprehensively the
approaches and results of all contributions dealing with judicial activism, we focus
here on the presentation of a new and indeed fascinating contribution by Maggi
and Staiger (2008). Their working paper is a prime example of formal economic
analysis of dispute Panels in trade agreements. The novel feature of their piece is
that it highlights the interaction and mutual dependency of contractual design
(how many resources can contracting parties be assumed to spend on writing
an ever-complete contract, and how should they phrase contractual rights and
obligations?) on the one hand, and the design of the DSB mandate on the other.
In fact, the formal model developed in the Maggi and Staiger paper views these
as two components of a single overarching institutional-design problem that
the framers of a trade agreement face at the time of the conclusion of their con-
tract.
Based on the work of Battigalli and Maggi (2002), and Horn et al. (2005, 2006),
Maggi and Staiger evaluate the possible mandate of the WTO DSB and its role
in helping parties to complete the incomplete trade contract. The paper starts
from the premise that contracting is a costly exercise and that the conclusion of a
CCC is not an option; incompleteness of the trade deal is an inevitable conse-
quence. This gives rise to three types of contractual gaps: rigidity (too few en-
vironmental contingencies are considered), discretion (too few rules constrain the
behavior of the parties), and vagueness (contingencies are only partially deﬁned,
giving rise to ambiguity, ambivalence, opposite interpretation, and mis-
understandings). The framers of the trade agreement, by deciding on the language
of the contract, to some extent can control which of the three gaps they deem the
smallest evil.
Maggi and Staiger (2008) then pair three possible roles of the WRO DSB with
the three forms of contract incompleteness: The DSB can interpret aspects of the
contract that are left vague ; the DSB can ﬁll gaps where the contract is silent and
therefore leaves governments with discretion ; and the DSB can grant exceptions
and thereby modify aspects of the contract that are too rigid. Or the DSB can be
excluded from fulﬁlling any of these functions and simply enforce contractual
obligations that are unambiguous.96
In order to characterize the contracting parties’ deliberate choice of contractual
incompleteness and the DSB design at the time of the conclusion of the agreement,
the paper constructs a static partial-equilibrium game with one industry and two
countries, each of which has one strategic choice: The importer can select a trade
policy of ‘protectionism’ or ‘free trade’, and the exporter can either ﬁle a com-
plaint at the DSB or refrain from doing so. Importantly, using the DSB is costly for
both parties. This game setup gives rise to a nontrivial strategic interaction in
which diﬀerent institutional arrangements aﬀect the equilibrium occurrence of
disputes.
96 Ibid., at 3.
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Without going into the details of the model, we summarize the most important
ﬁndings for our purposes. First, the most eﬃcient results (as compared to the
unachievable benchmark of the CCC) are attained if the DSB rulings are of a high
quality, the contracting parties opt for an activistDSB, and the contract is designed
such that it gives ex post discretion to contracting parties as well as a mandate of
gap-ﬁlling to the DSB. Second, if contracting parties must assume that DSB rulings
will be of intermediate quality, they are likely to opt for vagueness as a contractual
design tool to deal with the contractual incompleteness. The DSB consequently is
charged with interpreting this ambiguous language. However, this contractual
design produces less eﬃcient outcomes than the ﬁrst design option. Third, if the
accuracy of DSB rulings is anticipated to be of low quality (the probability that the
DSB will rule in error is high), contracting parties will prescribe the DSB with a
‘hands-oﬀ ’ policy, i.e. they will stipulate a nonactivist role for the trade court.
Dispute Panels will simply execute unambiguous contract language and leave
contractual incompleteness unbridged. This results in less eﬃcient outcomes as
compared to the CCC. Fourth, diminishing obligations bymodifying rigid contract
language is not an optimal institutional design, contrary to the suggestion of some
legal scholars (ibid. : 21).
Maggi and Staiger’s model suggests that the optimal combination of contract
design and DSB mandate is a function of the degree of accuracy of DSB rulings:
‘Notably, if DSB rulings are suﬃciently accurate and the DSB is given an activist
role, we show that the ﬁrst-best outcome can be achieved even though the contract
is highly incomplete, the use of the DSB is costly and the DSB rulings are imperfect.
The reason is that the threat of invoking the DSB and the expectation of a suﬃ-
ciently precise ruling is suﬃcient to induce governments to act eﬃciently ’ (ibid. : 4).
This implies that if the quality of the DSB rulings is reasonably good, fewer dis-
putes can be expected to occur in the ﬁrst place.97
To conclude, the new working paper by Maggi and Staiger (2008) suggests that
deliberately concluding an incomplete contract does not necessarily imply ef-
ﬁciency losses ex post. Leaving gaps can be optimal, but only when the DSB is
given an activist mandate and if the accuracy of DSB rulings is considerably high
(ibid. : 21). A necessary precondition for high accuracy of the DSB rulings is a
sound information basis for the dispute Panels that allows them to achieve a certain
threshold level of accuracy of their ruling.98 If the quality of rulings is inadequate
97 ‘Intuitively, if [the quality of DSB rulings is high], then the governments, expecting the DSB (in its
active role) to make the right decision [with high] probability, will act eﬃciently and avoid the DSB
intervention to save on the dispute cost_ This reﬂects the oﬀ-equilibrium impacts of the DSB’. (Ibid.:
at 19).
98 See ibid., at 22: ‘Our model therefore predicts that, at least if the costs of a dispute are suﬃciently
small, the DSB needs to have at least some information if an activist DSB role is to improve eﬃciency’.
Interestingly, Maggi and Staiger (ibid.: 37) ﬁnd that drawing adverse inferences from governments’
choices does not add to the eﬃciency of the system. Panels are unlikely to extract much information from
the observation of governments’ strategic choices. This suggests that dispute panels must not rely on what
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or random, rational contracting parties can be expected to deny dispute Panels any
role in completing the contract, and instead mandate them to simply enforce the
letter of the law. This outcome is accompanied by signiﬁcant eﬃciency losses and
more bad-faith (or opportunistic) disputes.99
4.1.3 How to operationalize Scenario 3?
For the above reasons, the authors of this paper feel compelled to advocate in favor
of a Scenario-3 reform of the DSB Panel process, at least as an option for Panels in
appropriate circumstances. An important question to consider is what, exactly,
would have to change in the language of the DSU or in the Panel practice to make
Scenario 3 a choice available for Panels. We believe that nothing in the wording of
the DSU would have to be altered to make way for Scenario 3, given the broad
language of DSU 11 and 13. However, assertions like the Appellate Body’s in
EC–Hormoneswould have to be reconsidered.100 There, the AB stated that a prima
facie case is ‘one which, in the absence of eﬀective refutation by the responding
party, requires a Panel, as a matter of law, to rule in favour of the complaining
party’.101 Under Scenario 3, it could be the Panel’s own autonomous inference,
instead of the Respondent’s, that provides for a successful rebuttal and completes
the defense.
One custom that dispute Panels102 most certainly would have to review and
reconsider is the timing and number of hearings during a DSB proceeding. Under
current procedures, the ﬁrst Panel hearing after the deposit of the ﬁrst written
submission by parties is largely ineﬀective – the Panel hasn’t yet read the submis-
sions and therefore has little to ask. Ideally, Panels should be able to direct ques-
tions and requests at parties throughout the Panel process, so as to satisfy their
information needs. This, however, would require the implementation of a pro-
cedure that does not signiﬁcantly increase the time required for Panel reports to be
issued.
the litigating parties say, but must venture out on independent factﬁnding missions in order to have any
lasting impact on the eﬃciency of the system.
99 Ibid., at 19: ‘Note that [the eﬃciency loss] is increasing in q [the probability of DSB error], for two
reasons: First, a higher q implies more frequent mistakes by the DSB when the DSB is invoked, and this
increases the expected cost of the DSB error given a dispute_ And second_ a higher q also increases the
number of states in which the DSB is invoked in equilibrium, and therefore increases the [instances in
which either importer government or exporter government act opportunistically and exploit the in-
completeness of the contract]. ’
100 Appellate Body Report, European Community – Measures Concerning Meat and Meat
Hormones, WT/DS/AB/R, adopted 13 February 1998, para. 104.
101 Ibid., para. 104.
102 We do not advocate extending Scenario 3 to the Appellate Body because under DSU art. 17 : 6 ‘An
appeal shall be limited to issues of law covered in the panel report and legal interpretations developed by
the panel’. The fact that the Appellate Body operates under a very strict schedule (90 days) and the fact
that a second hearing is completely absent in the AB procedures would also prevent the Appellate Body
from acquiring a broader role.
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4.2 Myopia of judicial economy?
At various points during the Turkey–Rice Report, the Panel has exercised judicial
economy. Although cognizant of the fact that judicial economy is an important
concept in theWTO (not least given the tight deadlines under which Panels and the
AB are operating), we have some concerns about the practice from both a law-and-
economics perspective and a systemic perspective.
Here, we note the Panel’s decision to exercise judicial economy and not to
examine the claim that Turkey’s domestic purchase requirement for in-quota im-
ports in conjunction with its denial to grant out-of-quota licenses to importers of
rice violates WTO law and nulliﬁes and impairs US beneﬁts. Where a dispute
escalates and reaches a DSU Article 22.6 arbitration, as seems to be the developing
situation in Turkey–Rice,103 the way in which two WTO violations act in concert
may very well matter. The level of trade damages (or ‘nulliﬁcation and impair-
ment’) suﬀered by the United States due to a series of illegal measures working
in combination could well be higher than trade damages resulting from each illegal
measure individually. Yet, in order for the United States to pursue its case that it
suﬀered nulliﬁcation and impairment through the interaction of these violating
measures at a level higher than the mere sum of eﬀects, the Arbitrator would
probably demand proof in form of a relevant Panel or AB judgment.
Still, Panels have been very recalcitrant to act as stirrup-holder for later WTO
arbitrations.104 This creates nontrivial problems for Art. 22.6 arbitrations, the ﬁnal
and, indeed, salient chapter of DSB litigation. It would therefore be advantageous
if Panels and the AB were more mindful of later steps of the litigation process, even
though Article 22.6 arbitrations are not a common occurrence.
Perhaps a more serious problem is the one faced by the AB when it wishes to
decide the case on a diﬀerent legal basis from that chosen by the Panel. Suppose,
for example, we enter the appeal phase in Rice and the AB preferred to focus on
GATT Article XI? An incomplete factual and legal record would have precluded
such an approach. It is not surprising that in one recent AB report, Brazil–Tyres,105
the Appellate Body chided the Panel, emphasizing that a ‘[P]anel’s discretion to
103 In May 2008 the United States and Turkey announced that they had reached a ‘sequencing
agreement’ on further proceedings under DSU Arts. 21.5 and 22, based on the United States’ allegations
that Turkey had not properly implemented the Panel Report. See Understanding between Turkey and the
United States Regarding Procedures under Articles 21 and 22 of the DSU, WT/DS334/13, 13 May 2008.
104 See Panel Report in US–Cotton : ‘Nothing in the text or context of Article 21.5 of the DSU
indicates that one of the functions of a panel in a proceeding under Article 21.5 of the DSU is to assist
arbitrators [footnote omitted] in proceedings under Articles 7.10 of the SCM Agreement or Article 22.6 of
the DSU to determine the amount of countermeasures or the amount of suspension of concessions or
obligations and that, to this end, the panel must make ﬁndings as to the existence or consistency with a
covered agreement of measures taken to comply other than as of the date of the establishment of a panel. ’
(United States – Subsidies on Upland Cotton (21.5), WT/DS267/AB/RW, AB Report circulated 2 June
2008, para. 9.68).
105 Appellate Body Report, Brazil – Measures Aﬀecting Imports of Retreaded Tyres, WT/DS332/AB/
R, adopted 17 December 2007.
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decline to rule on diﬀerent claims of inconsistency_ is limited by its duty to make
ﬁndings that will allow the DSB to make suﬃciently precise recommendations and
rulings ‘‘ in order to ensure eﬀective resolution of disputes to the beneﬁt of all
Members ’’ ’.106 The prospect of a Scenario 3 approach by the Panel could very well
result in a Panel report with the stronger factual (as well as legal) analysis that
would facilitate broader AB consideration of the issues and fewer cases that are
undecided because the AB cannot complete the analysis.
Although not couched in judicial-economy language, the Panel also declined to
make a recommendation in response to the United States ’ request that it determine
that Turkey’s domestic purchase requirement was inconsistent with Article 2.1
and paragraph 1(a) of the Annex to the TRIMs Agreement.107 The Panel decided
that, because the measure no longer existed at the time of the Panel report and
Turkey had declared it did not intend to reintroduce the questioned measure, ‘we
do not believe that there is any need for the Panel to recommend to the DSB that it
make any request to Turkey in this regard’.108 Given the Panel’s evident frustration
with Turkey’s stonewalling on providing essential evidence, it is somewhat sur-
prising that the Panel was willing to leave the United States in the position of
having to bring a new DSB action should Turkey in fact introduce a similar
measure in the future, and to deprive other members of the beneﬁts of its analysis.
For the reasons discussed above in addressing judicial economy, we believe the
Panel should have issued a ruling on this issue as well.
5. Summary and conclusions
Turkey–Rice will not go down in history as the most intriguing and challenging
WTO case ever litigated. The overwhelming evidence leaves hardly any doubt
about Turkey’s illegal red-tape measures. The steadfast refusal of Turkey’s defense
to provide exonerating evidence and the Panel’s drawing of appropriate inference
were probably the most remarkable issues of the case.
Yet, we believe that the case raised at least three pertinent legal and economic
questions: (i) was the Panel’s discrimination test of Art. III :4 GATT wisely cho-
sen?; (ii) was the Panel’s exercise of judicial economy myopic?; and (iii) what
concept of a Panel process is currently preeminent in the DSB, and with what
consequences for Panels’ inferences and parties’ strategic incentives to provide
information?
As indicated in note 103, the compliance proceedings under DSU Article 21.5 in
Rice are underway. We are looking forward with curiosity and anticipation to
what the sequel of the Rice Age-saga will have in stock for the ALI Reporters in the
future_.
106 Ibid., para. 257, quoting Appellate Body Report, Australia – Measures Aﬀecting Importation of
Salmon, WT/DS18/AB/R, adopted 6 November 1998, para. 223.
107 Panel Report, Turkey–Rice, para. 7.256.
108 Ibid., para. 7.272.
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